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Only twenty years ago the communist states in Eastern Europe and East Asia were 
remarkably similar in terms of both their dominant ideologies and their economic 
structures. In both regions the Communist Party exercised supreme control over the 
economy, politics and cultural life. Public education was geared towards delivering 
technicians and professionals faithful to party and state and satisfied with the narrow 
range of intellectual pursuits permitted by the authorities. The humanities (history, 
literature) and social studies (geography, civics) in particular served to nurture 
unconditional loyalty to communist ideology, while suppressing heterodox views. 
However, since the mid-1980s, crisis in the command economy and a failure to keep 
pace with the West in technological development have motivated or compelled 
political elites in both regions to liberalise their economies and engage in market 
reforms. 
This, however, is where the similarities between the two regions end. From the 
late 1980s the two regions have followed radically different trajectories. While China 
and Vietnam have restricted reform to the economic sphere, the former Warsaw Pact 
countries matched their new economic liberties with greater freedom in the political 
and cultural arenas. This freedom set in motion an uncontrollable chain of events 
that not only led to the demise of communism but also to the disintegration of 
several multinational federal states. From the ashes of these states—the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia—a multitude of new sovereign nations arose, 
most of which had little or no recent history of independent statehood. With the 
exceptions of Belarus and Turkmenistan, these new states have—at least formally— 
embraced the principles of liberalism, democracy and the rule of law. 
At the same time, the post-communist states in Eastern Europe have sought to 
win international recognition and prestige by joining bodies such as the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (COE), 
intergovernmental organizations that promote and monitor democracy, human 
rights, freedom of speech and interethnic tolerance. Almost all of these states have 
signed international treaties committing them to pursue liberal-democratic policies 
and have invited the OSCE and the COE to undertake joint projects aimed at 
reforming and democratizing their national education systems. Some states have 
moved beyond this and have voluntarily ceded some decision-making autonomy by  
acceding to the European Union and NATO. Others still aspire to become members 
of these supranational organizations. 
By contrast, regional forms of integration are conspicuously absent in East 
Asia. According to Vickers (2005), this difference has its origins in the Cold War era. 
Whereas West-European leaders, urged on by the Americans, moved swiftly after 
1945 to establish cooperative military and economic structures as a counterweight to 
the Eastern Bloc, East Asian states were never called upon by the Americans to take 
joint responsibility for their own security, and, as a consequence, remained 
thoroughly inward-looking in the post-war period. Hein and Selden (2000) hold 
this differential rate of regional integration to be the key factor explaining the 
contrasting ways in which Germany and Japan have dealt with their wartime 
histories. While Germany had no choice but to look its Nazi past in the face in order 
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to be accepted as a trustworthy partner within international structures such as the 
EEC/EU, Japan lacked any similar incentive to undertake such searching scrutiny of 
its own role in World War II. 
 
Diverging educational trajectories 
 
All these observations raise an interesting set of questions: Have the diverging 
political trajectories of Eastern Europe and East Asia over the past fifteen years been 
reflected in the teaching of humanities and social science disciplines? Or, to put it 
more directly, is education in states such as China and Vietnam still imposing a 
single, ideologically-slanted vision of society and history, while in Eastern Europe, 
greater recognition of diversity has replaced the crude political indoctrination of the 
past? If the teaching of ‘sensitive’ disciplines has indeed developed differently in 
these two regions, can pedagogical trends be directly related to the diverging political 
trajectories? And to what extent can change (or the lack of it) in dominant political 
ideologies and educational philosophies be attributed to cultural or historical factors 
that predate and transcend the recent legacy of communism and the Cold War? 
These are the concerns that motivate the current special issue. 
It is tempting to jump to conclusions and argue that political change and the 
development of disciplines such as history are so obviously related that there is little 
need for academics to labour the fact. Yet, on close inspection it is difficult to make a 
case for democracy and regional integration as sufficient conditions for pluralist 
educational practices. Democracy and liberalism have not prevented Western 
powers from using education to promote patriotism and feelings of national 
superiority in the past. Marsden (2000), for instance, notes that British, French and 
American history and geography textbooks rivalled their German counterparts in the 
glorification of war and the vilification of neighbouring nations in the first half of the 
twentieth century, despite the efforts of the League of Nations to curb rampant 
chauvinism. This precedent appears to demonstrate that liberal democratic political 
structures are in themselves no guarantee of pedagogical liberalism, although within 
a broader context of international integration they can function as a necessary 
(though not sufficient) precondition for liberal educational reforms. Indeed,  
encouraged by UNESCO and the Council of Europe, West-European states began 
removing nationalist leanings and ethnic stereotypes from their educational 
materials after World War II (Berghahn & Schissler, 1987). Thematically, teaching 
materials tended to diversify, addressing socio-economic, cultural, gender and 
international issues in addition to the traditional themes of high politics and war. In 
terms of pedagogical objectives, they exchanged the inculcation of received 
identities, values and pre-digested ‘truths’ for the promotion of skills associated 
with active democratic citizenship—critical thinking, causal understanding and 
independent analysis. Parallel to this process, the emphasis in curriculum content 
shifted from the national to the international level. Discussing the evolution of 
history and civics textbooks in postwar France and Germany, Soysal, Bertilotti and 
Mannitz (2005) for instance argue that both countries (France later than Germany) 
have stopped seeing the national and transnational as rival notions and have firmly 
placed their national histories and identities in a European context. 
Nonetheless, scepticism regarding the real impact of regional integration has 
remained. Some commentators have argued that some of the newly independent states 
only wish to join the European Union and NATO for economic and security reasons. 
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The political elites of these states, it has been alleged, only participate in the OSCE 
and the COE in order to improve the prospects of their countries being accepted as 
members of the European Union or NATO, without being truly committed to the 
values the OSCE and the COE stand for. When placed in the international spotlight 
they welcome educational reforms supported by the COE, while behind the scenes 
taking steps to undermine these reforms. Even if this cynical view of the true 
intentions of East European policy makers proves to be false and curriculum designers 
and textbook writers prove to be genuinely embracing the values of democracy, 
freedom, human rights and tolerance, it still remains to be seen whether a discourse 
nurturing these values is accepted at the grass roots level. Until very recently, Eastern 
Europe frequently made the headlines for outbreaks of intolerant ethnic nationalism 
and brutal civil wars. Given their turbulent histories, people in the region have 
developed a profound distrust of politicians, state authority and government 
initiatives. In these circumstances teachers and parents may well sabotage top-down 
educational reforms preaching ethnic tolerance and challenging traditional modes of 
teaching. Meanwhile, it is debatable whether initiatives from the COE such as the 
Education for Democratic Citizenship programme are currently receiving a warm 
welcome even in Western Europe, supposedly the ‘model’ region regarding 
integration and cooperation. In recent years, public scepticism over the benefits of 
ongoing international (and interethnic) integration has grown, as witnessed by the 
rejection of the European Constitution in referenda in France and the Netherlands. 
Nor has the process of regional integration prevented a renewed eruption of 
xenophobic sentiments in Western Europe, as demonstrated by the recent electoral 
success of parties campaigning on populist anti-immigrant platforms in France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Austria. While the notion of multiculturalism 
has fallen out of favour in public debate, there is a growing demand in some quarters 
for education to resume its traditional task of fostering unquestioned national 
identities. 
 
The need for nation-building 
 
In addition, it should be borne in mind that many of the post-communist states in 
Eastern Europe are historical novelties. As a rule, new states tend to give a high 
priority to nation-building (Coulby, 1997). Nation-building is generally seen by the 
governing elites of these states as an indispensable tool for the consolidation of 
national identity and loyalty to the state. Without it the survival of the nation-state is 
felt to be at risk. Nation-building architects typically make use of history and 
literature education to promote historical narratives that embody the teleology of 
selfdetermination. 
By highlighting ‘historical injustices’ committed by ‘foreign oppressors’, 
this narrative carefully constructs an argument legitimizing the newly attained 
political independence. Geography is called in to supply a visual representation of an 
ethnic homeland that the national community can ‘rightfully’ claim as ‘theirs’. 
Unsurprisingly, this area is usually depicted in larger dimensions than the current 
state territory. Civics, too, has a role to play in the identity construction project by 
teaching pupils how to be good and loyal citizens eager to devote their energies to the 
prosperity of the nation. It is questionable whether the commitment of new states to 
liberal democracy will override the impulse to promote totalising visions of the nation 
in cases of tension between these orientations. Will these states maintain their 
commitment to democratic principles such as freedom of speech if people start to 
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question the myths and wayside shrines underpinning nation- and statehood? More 
fundamentally, it has been argued that the historiographies of the new states in 
Eastern Europe are essentially as monolithic and intolerant to alternative views as 
those of their communist predecessors, merely exchanging a communist ideological 
colouring for a nationalist one. Writing about Ukraine as one of these new states, 
Stepanenko (1999, p. 113), for instance, notes that: 
 
Ironically, the prevailing discourse on ‘our’ Ukrainian history often reproduces the 
authoritarian characteristics of ‘their’ (Soviet and Russian) versions of history. They 
both aim to affirm their single vision suppressing the ‘other’ perspective. […] This 
reveals the genealogical relatedness of post-communist mentality to its communist 
prototype. 
 
Interestingly, the very same transformation—from communist to nationalist 
accounts of history—has been noted for China. Jones (2005), for instance, observes 
that a nationalist narrative was always present even when China still indoctrinated its 
youth with communist ideology, but that nationalism emphatically moved to the 
foreground in history education when attention to class issues faded away. She also 
notes that the history curriculum, remarkably, now includes several new objectives, 
such as encouraging students to use their imagination, form their own opinions and 
derive their own conclusions from data, alongside the more traditional aim of 
nurturing love for the motherland—though the espousal of such ostensibly 
progressive aims is perhaps inspired less by acceptance of the liberal values they 
embody than by a sense that the fostering of creativity and critical thinking skills are 
important for China’s success in the global ‘knowledge economy’. Similar tensions— 
between the use of patriotic education to promote or maintain social cohesion on the 
one hand, and the espousal of critical thinking and creativity as desirable pedagogical 
objectives on the other—may prove to be part of the picture in all of the countries 
discussed in these chapters, but such superficial similarities by no means necessarily 




The contributors to the current issue approach the problems outlined above each 
from their own field of expertise and specific research interest. This means that some 
papers will focus on history education while others deal with civics or modes of 
education outside the school setting (museums for instance). Some will be primarily 
interested in curricula formation and textbook content whereas others pay close 
attention to the reception of educational practices at grassroots level. What unites 
them however is that they all have an interest in the use of education for the 
inculcation of ideologies and identities and the forces that shape this particular 
function of education in different national contexts. 
Examining post-Soviet Moldova, Elizabeth Anderson argues that Moldovan 
national history textbooks have become highly controversial as concepts of the 
nation and national identity remain bitterly contested. Some define Moldovan 
nationhood in ethnic-Romanian terms whereas others have more statist or inclusive 
notions of national identity. Despite these contrasting opinions, government 
officials, historians, textbook authors and teachers alike consider history education 
to be the cornerstone of societal development and they have endowed it with the 
weighty purposes of transmitting ideas about the nation and the state and of creating 
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and maintaining national identity and citizenship. Drawing from interviews with 
high school teachers, historians and government officials, Anderson’s paper 
examines the disagreement over the definition of the Moldovan nation and identity 
between the intellectual elites who write the textbooks, and the state, which pays for 
their publication. Anderson argues that the government and the intellectual elite fail 
to understand how the Moldovan populace define themselves and the role of 
national identity in their lives. She concludes that the incongruence between these 
groups complicates the formation of a cohesive democratic citizenry through 
education and thereby further impedes the democratization of Post-Soviet Moldova. 
It is interesting to contrast tiny Moldova with giant Russia. Is Russia because of 
its sheer size and demographic weight much more immune to external influences 
and therefore more inward-looking than Moldova? Joseph Zajda examines the state 
of history education in this largest of all Soviet successor states. His paper analyses 
the new generation of post-Soviet history textbooks used in Russian upper secondary 
schools, and assesses to what extent these textbooks reflect or promote a transition 
from the totalising uniformity of communism towards greater democratic pluralism. 
Zajda discusses the re-invention of the State, and the resultant ideological and 
cultural issues involved in searching for a new national identity and ethic of 
citizenship during the present transitional period. 
Located between Moldova and Russia, medium-sized Ukraine inherited a 
complex cultural mosaic from the Soviet Union. The country’s main fault line is a 
linguistic one dividing the population in roughly equal halves of Ukrainian-speakers 
located in the western and central regions of the country and Russian-speakers, who 
are predominantly living in the eastern and southern regions. Germ Janmaat’s paper 
shows how the post-Soviet authorities, anxious to reduce the country’s cultural 
complexity, have seized on history education to promote a sense of nationhood that 
maximizes Ukrainian distinctiveness vis-a`-vis Russia. His prime concern is with 
portrayals of Russia as a foreign ruler and the ethnic Russians as the key ethnic 
other in history textbooks for the compulsory school course History of Ukraine. 
Ethnic stereotyping, he argues, is almost unavoidable in states with nationalizing 
programmes as it serves important functions for national identity construction. He 
traces the development of history textbook writing from independence to recent 
times and assesses the dynamics of internal and external pressures, specifically in 
relation to identity construction and other objectives of history education. He 
concludes that Russia and its rulers are systematically portrayed as forces seeking to 
exploit Ukraine and its population for their own purposes. Never, he argues, are the 
country’s former Russian rulers credited with positive moral qualities, such as a 
genuine concern for the lot of Ukrainians. The function of this consistent 
depreciating of the foreign ruler, he continues, is to offer a solid justification for 
an independent Ukrainian state. Recently, however, a variety of grass-roots and 
international forces have gained in strength and there are indications that the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Education is listening to their demands. This is likely to result 
in a major reform of history education, a professional field hitherto thoroughly 
dominated by academics and the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia. 
Kazakhstan presents an interesting case for examining how national identity 
and citizenship are shaped through curriculum, as this former Soviet Central Asian 
republic straddles Europe and Asia both geographically and culturally. Kazakhstan’s 
location in Eurasia lends itself to embracing elements of the two regions covered in 
this special issue, including a traditional nomadic past and Islamic heritage, the 
processes of modernization under Soviet rule, and more recently, the country’s 
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aspirations to align with the world (including European) economy. Drawing on Soviet 
and post-Soviet literature textbooks for Kazakh-medium schools, educational policies 
and the literary discourse among the cultural intelligentsia, Jazira Asanova examines 
national identity and citizenship constructs in the literature curriculum. She finds that 
national identity and civic allegiance are based on notions of common belonging and 
shared historical, cultural and ethnic roots. The predominantly monolithic, 
monocultural identities in the literature textbooks are, however, in contrast to 
Kazakhstan’s history curriculum, which attempts to maintain a balance between 
ethno-nationalizing and multicultural identities and is more consistent with the 
officially declared multicultural rhetoric. Asanova also argues that the promotion by 
the literature textbooks of a socially responsible individual, whose civic duty is to put 
the collective ‘we’ above individualistic interests, reflects holdover tendencies of the 
Socialist Realism and its ideological concerns. Asanova’s research reveals the 
contradictory, fragmented nature of national identity as represented in the school 
curriculum, and points more broadly to Kazakhstan’s national identity as a fluid and 
hybrid construction embracing modernization, international integration, poly-
culturalism, patriotism and ethno-nationalism. 
So how do the three Asian cases investigated in this issue compare to their 
postcommunist European counterparts? Focusing on Vietnam, Matthieu Salomon 
points out that the image of the ascent to power of the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP) is ambivalent insofar as it encompasses notions of both national liberation 
and communist victory. This image has combined the historical success of Vietnam, 
its right to exist and the communist dream of creating a new man (con nguoi moi). 
These two dimensions have always existed in communist Vietnam, Salomon argues. 
The question must be: how have they coexisted with each other, how have they been 
prioritized? To investigate this question, he explores the role of Vietnamese history 
education in the promotion of both ideologies before and after the Doˆi moi reforms. 
Special attention is given to impact of international agencies. Has Vietnam’s 
economic integration in the world economy and its political involvement in the 
regional ASEAN forum since the Doi moi reforms also resulted in more cross-border 
contacts and influences in the cultural and educational domains? Another question 
to be explored is whether the regime matters: would the representation of the 
Vietnamese nation and national identity be significantly different under another 
political regime? Salomon concludes that ever since the communist takeover of 
power and certainly after the Doi moi reforms national identity construction has 
been at least as important an objective (if not a more important one) for history 
education as has the inculcation of communist ideology. The role of the VCP as the 
accoucheur of Vietnam as a modern nation state is the key point of the official 
education/propaganda. Salomon further argues that the essence of the ‘eternal/ 
primordial Vietnamese nationhood’ would almost certainly remain quasi identical 
under a different regime because the opponents of the current regime (such as the 
Viet Kieˆu dissidents groups) subscribe to the same ethnonationalist understanding 
of Vietnamese nationhood and share an antagonistic attitude to neighbouring 
national communities, particularly China. 
China forms the subject of the paper by Edward Vickers, who examines the 
representation of Chinese identity in museums in the People’s Republic of China, 
comparing this briefly with the portrayal of local and national identities in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. He looks particularly at the implications for museums of the shift 
in emphasis within state ideology from socialism to patriotism—a shift that has been 
particularly marked since the early 1990s. Museums in contemporary China are 
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officially designated as ‘bases for patriotic education’, but the content of the 
‘patriotism’ that they are meant to promote remains in many respects vague or 
problematic. One of the key tensions here is that between a deep-rooted assumption 
of equivalence between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Han’ culture and history, and the 
multicultural reality of the contemporary People’s Republic—including as it does 
a range of non-Han groups such as Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongols. The progressive 
abandonment of socialism has in some ways exposed these contradictions more 
starkly in recent years. Meanwhile, the homogenous and totalising official vision of 
Chinese identity in general, and Han identity in particular, is contested either at the 
popular or the official level (or both) in the largely Han communities of Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. In a rapidly commercialising and modernising China, the promotion of 
a state-centred patriotism has become a key instrument for the regime in its efforts to 
preserve its legitimacy, and museums represent a key element in this strategy. 
Arguments for a quintessentially ‘Asian’ approach to values and citizenship have 
enjoyed great popularity with some of East Asia’s more authoritarian political 
regimes in recent years.  
One country where ‘Asian’ values have been promoted and 
popularised by the government is the predominantly Chinese city state of 
Singapore. Whereas some of the contributions to this special issue deal with 
nation building in the democratising former East European communist states in the 
wider ideological context of liberal democratic thought, Christine Han’s paper 
presents a view of democracy and democratisation from an alternative, ‘Asian’ 
perspective. South East Asian nations, such as Singapore, have attempted to 
articulate and practise forms of ‘Asian’ democracy as a response to, and in rejection 
of, the Western liberal democratic version (and, in many cases, in conscious and 
explicit rejection of communism). In these countries, there is not so much a 
programme of reform and liberalisation (economically towards capitalism, and 
politically towards liberal democracy) as an effort to evolve a form of democracy 
suited to an ‘Asian’ society. Singapore is examined as a specific example of how a 
government has set about doing this. Han shows how the education system is used to 
create citizens who will not only be accepting of this type of democracy, but who will 
also develop a form of national identity that is in keeping with it. The subjects of 
history and civics and moral education have traditionally been used to this end but, 
in recent years, national education has been added to the resources available to 
schools. Han’s paper demonstrates that there is indeed a distinctive form of values and 
democracy that is taught in schools. But, while this is referred to as ‘Asian’, there is 
in fact a lacuna in terms of the wider values framework and context, and children are 
in effect being socialised into accepting a rather passive conception of citizenship and 
a notion of democracy that is arguably distinctive to Singapore. What Asia stands for 
is far too diverse to be squeezed into the term ‘Asian values’ and, Han concludes, 
there is perhaps also, on the part of Singapore and its political leaders, an inclination 




So what are the contributions to this issue telling us? An important finding is that the 
inculcation of national loyalties through formal education or other cultural activities 
remains a major concern of all the states reviewed in this issue. The contributions 
highlight how these states, in various ways, disseminate images of the nation as an 
entity that is distinctive in terms of historical experience, cultural attributes and 
 8 
community of values. The institution of (formal) democracy in the post-communist 
countries has in this sense not prevented or diminished the use of education for 
identity construction purposes. The contributions also show that none of the states is 
immune to the new educational discourse stressing analytical skills and independent 
thinking, although, as pointed out before, it remains unclear whether the adoption of 
this discourse in curriculum guidelines reflects a commitment to liberal values or a 
desire to enhance the country’s competitiveness. Nonetheless, in Moldova and 
Ukraine, as the papers by Anderson and Janmaat suggest, the new discourse has 
caused a rift between government officials and the cultural intelligentsia, who are the 
driving force behind the nation-building project. The increasingly contested nature 
of education policies in these countries is an indication that the different political 
trajectories of the post-communist European states, in comparison to the 
authoritarian Asian states, are carrying over into the educational sphere, in the 
sense that the outcome of the policy process is less monolithic and less predictable in 
the former. It is too early however to state with any measure of certainty whether the 
growing public debate on educational issues in these countries will also reduce the 
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